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ABSTRACT
While applications of machine learning in cyber-security have grown rapidly, most models use
manually constructed features. This manual approach is error-prone and requires domain expertise.
In this paper, we design a self-supervised sequence-to-sequence model with attention to learn an
embedding for data routinely used in cyber-security applications. The method is validated on two
real world public data sets. The learned features are used in an anomaly detection model and perform
better than learned features from baseline methods.
1 Introduction
Increasingly, enterprises are storing and processing vast amounts of data to detect security threats and compromises. To
build models for efficient detection, machine learning tools currently show the most promise. One of the important tasks
in building a machine learning model is coming up with a good set of features. This usually requires deep knowledge
and understanding of the problem domain, and even then constructing good features for a particular task involves quite
a bit of trial and error. High quality features constructed for a specific task (e.g., anomaly detection) simplify model
building, and result in even simple machine learning methods performing sufficiently well.
In recent years, the fields of computer vision and natural language processing have made great strides using deep
learning models to learn features from raw inputs instead of a domain expert manually engineering features. This has
been mainly possible through use of supervised learning on large scale labelled image data sets (most notably imagenet
[1]) in the case of computer vision, and self-supervised learning on large corpora of texts in the case of natural language
processing.
In this paper, we explore the use of feature learning, in place of feature engineering, for building machine learning
models on security data. Specifically, we look at how the learned features or representations perform on the popular task
of anomaly detection to detect unusual behavior, which may indicate an attack, a compromise or a misconfiguration
(which may make a system more vulnerable to compromise). Security data refers to network or host data that enterprises
typically monitor for security threats and attacks.
We focus on two main challenges faced while learning features for security data. First, security data is unlabelled. Thus,
it is difficult to learn features and the final task jointly as is done in image recognition. Furthermore, security attacks are
ever evolving, so even if a lot of effort is spent on labeling data, it will only work for known attacks, not for previously
unseen or “zero-day” attacks. Secondly, while humans are good at perceiving and understanding images and natural
language, and can immediately recognize if meaningful features are being learned for these two modalities, the same
cannot be said for say logs of network traffic or system calls.
To address the first challenge, we use self-supervised learning, a subset of unsupervised learning, where implicit labels
available within the data are used for supervision on a pretext task[2]. In particular, we use a sequence-to-sequence
prediction task, modeled using a recurrent neural network model, aided by an attention mechanism. We refer to this
method as AS2S (attention-based sequence-to-sequence model). A general solution to the second challenge is difficult;
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we explore it in a limited fashion in the context of anomaly detection by using a partially labelled data set1 to compute
precision and recall. We also visually inspect how the learned features in a two-dimensional embedded space evolve
during training.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the learned representations, we use two real data sets to evaluate the performance
for anomaly detection. These data sets include partial ground truth labels enabling quantification of the results. One of
the data sets consists of network traffic, while the other contains network and host data. Both of these can be considered
as a multivariate temporal sequence of attributes. The results show that the attention-based sequence-to-sequence model
performs better than the two selected baselines, namely a principal component analysis (PCA)-based model and an
auto-encoder based model. Furthermore, we observe as training progresses, the features learned by our model are better
able to separate normal and anomalous data points.
We make the following key contributions:
• We demonstrate how to perform feature learning for security data using attention and self-supervision
• We provide performance results for this method on two real world public data sets
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in the next section, followed by our solution
approach in Section 3. Experimental results are presented in Section 4, followed by conclusions and future work.
2 Related Work
Automatically extracting or learning suitable features from raw data without human intervention has been a grand
challenge in machine learning. In fact, the basic idea can be traced back to Herbert Simon who said in 1969, “Solving a
problem simply means representing it so as to make the solution transparent" [3]. Over time diverse techniques [4, 2]
have originated in different research communities and include: feature selection, dimensionality reduction, manifold
learning, distance metric learning and representation learning. Extracting features via layers of a neural network is
commonly referred to as representation learning [4, 5], also known as feature learning and is the focus of this paper in
the context of security data, and its application to machine learning models to detect security anomalies.
Anomaly detection in the area of cyber-security has received considerable research interest and has a long history,
although most deployed systems are rule-based, and application of machine learning for anomaly detection in security
has unique challenges [6]. Early work tended to use statistics like moving average or PCA to locate anomalies [7]. Such
methods worked well in simple cases, but as modern IT systems and data get larger and more complex, the methods
failed to scale with them. Clustering-based and nearest-neighbor-based methods were proposed [8, 9] to utilize locality
of data, but they suffer from both a lack of scalability and the curse of dimensionality.
Supervised learning is not attractive for anomaly detection since labelled data is scarce. Furthermore, especially for
security anomalies, the presence of adversaries make the anomalies (threats and attacks) dynamic and constantly
changing. Thus, the most common setting for anomaly detection is unsupervised or self-supervised [2].
Recently, neural-network-based methods have gained much attention, as the computational performance problem
is gradually mitigated by advanced optimization algorithms and running parallel cores. Xu et al. [10] proposed a
de-noising auto-encoder-based method, which is a prototypical two-phased framework. An unsupervised learning
model, the auto-encoder, is first trained with a large data set to get the distributional representations, and later the
representations are used in another domain-related application. However, auto-encoder-based models failed to facilitate
temporal relationships, which is considered an important component of detecting anomalies. Tuor et al. [11] adapted
a multi-layer LSTM model but with a different special assumption that the corresponding inputs and outputs of the
network should not differ by more than a threshold; otherwise, it is an anomaly. Similarly, Malhotra et al. [12] proposed
an LSTM-based encoder-decoder for anomaly detection on machine signals. Such a model is essentially an auto-encoder
between a pair of sequences, which models temporal information. It can identify anomalous sequences when the
reconstruction error is large. All of these studies use the underlying principle that fitting models to data by minimizing
reconstruction error can help identify anomalies.
Attention mechanism is a breakthrough component proposed to strengthen the encoder-decoder model. In addition to the
ability of decoding quality sequences, it provides soft alignments between the inputs and outputs, which helps explain
the sequence generated. More recently BERT/Transformer architecture [13] was proposed that uses self-attention.
Attention mechanism has proved to be useful in neural machine translation [14, 15], machine reading comprehension
[16], and video captioning [17]. However, its application to cyber-security anomaly detection has not been explored
before. We do not use self-attention, but an auto-encoder with a basic attention component to train the representations.
1The labels are only used for evaluating performance, not for training.
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Figure 1: FL4S Framework
In our work, we also adopt the prototypical two-phase learning framework, as it offers us an opportunity to generalize
the use of the learned representations, which is a solid foundation for building a robust universal anomaly detection
system. An LSTM encoder-decoder network coupled with attention mechanism is explored in the first phase of learning
universal representations for security data. Evaluation and analysis on applying the learned representations in anomaly
detection are also investigated.
3 Our Solution Approach
Fig. 1. shows the architecture of our approach, which we call Feature Learning for Security (FL4S) framework. It
consists of three main components: Raw Feature Extraction, Clustering, and Feature Learning, which are executed
sequentially. The following subsections introduce the data sets used and the three components in detail.
3.1 Raw Feature Extraction
In this initial step, we extract simple features that do not require input from a domain expert. The goal is to use basic
representations of the data so we can perform feature learning on top of them. Security data can be broadly categorized
as network data and host data.
Network or network traffic data refers to summary information about network communication typically collected at a
router or a special appliance installed in an enterprise network to collect such data. Commonly, such data is collected at
an edge router where it captures both ingress and egress packet data. A popular network traffic data format is netflow
that includes fields such as IP addresses, port numbers, number of bytes, packets exchanged, application level protocol
(inferred from port information), etc. Host data refers to data collected at a particular machine, and may include data
pertaining to filesystem access,system calls, login and logout information, connection and disconnection of devices,
etc. Security analysts are typically interested in which users or hosts are compromised, or pose a risk. Thus we extract
data specific to users. Further, data generated by users can vary highly over time, and features are aggregated by
time windows. We extract the raw features for each user and for each pre-defined time window duration. We tried
window sizes of 3, 6, 12, and 24 hours; we observed that 24 hour windows gave the best results. Thus, in the following,
all references to windows relate to window sizes of 24 hours. Note that multiple time windows could also be used
simultaneously to train multiple models. In addition, since users usually have similar data patterns on a weekly basis,
we consider week-long user sequences. Therefore, we redefine each user example as a user-week example. Fig. 2
illustrates this idea. We also ignore windows during weekends, because they usually have different data patterns than
weekdays. As a result, each user-week example has five feature vectors, one for each window (day). This organization
also avoids long sequences for each example, which increases the difficulty of capturing data patterns. Similar models
can be built with weekend data as well. As shown in Fig. 2, the data takes the form of a three dimensional tensor:
(user-window (UW), time-window, feature (Fij)), where each of the Fij is a feature vector.
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Figure 2: Extracted Raw Features
Security analysts are typically interested in which users or hosts are compromised, or pose a risk. Thus we extract
data specific to users. Further, data generated by users can vary highly over time, and features are aggregated by
time windows. We extract the raw features for each user and for each pre-defined time window duration. We tried
window sizes of 3, 6, 12, and 24 hours; we observed that 24 hour windows gave the best results. Thus, in the following,
all references to windows relate to window sizes of 24 hours. Note that multiple time windows could also be used
simultaneously to train multiple models. In addition, since users usually have similar data patterns on a weekly basis,
we consider week-long user sequences. Therefore, we redefine each user example as a user-week example. Fig. 2
illustrates this idea. We also ignore windows during weekends, because they usually have different data patterns than
weekdays. As a result, each user-week example has five feature vectors, one for each window (day). This organization
also avoids long sequences for each example, which increases the difficulty of capturing data patterns. Similar models
can be built with weekend data as well. As shown in Fig. 2, the data takes the form of a three dimensional tensor:
(user-window (UW), time-window, feature (Fij)), where each of the Fij is a feature vector.
3.2 Segmentation
A separate model could be built for each user. However, the number of IP addresses is typically large, and several
IPs may not have enough data associated with them to train a model. On the other hand, user behavior shows high
variance, and it is difficult to capture all user behavior with a single model. Therefore, we segment users into clusters,
and a model is trained for each cluster. A subset of the training features are used for clustering the users. Since most
clustering algorithms suffer from the curse of dimensionality, we want to avoid high-dimensional feature vectors during
clustering.
Clustering is an important part of this framework, as it not only groups users that should have similar data patterns but
also does filtering to some extent. In our experiments, we noticed that there is one group that has a higher number of
anomalies, which means anomalies do share some level of similarities. As the number of normal data points are still far
larger than the anomalies, we are still able to train quality models. For one of the data sets used in the experiments,
the classic k-means clustering is chosen. Although k-means is a simple algorithm, it provides reasonably good results.
More sophisticated clustering algorithms might be explored in future work. For the other data set, k-modes clustering
[18] is chosen. It is a k-means variant for categorical data.
To determine a proper k for each algorithm, we use Silhouette Coefficient (SC), which is defined as: SC(i) =
b(i)−a(i)
max{a(i),b(i)} , where a(i) is the average dissimilarity to the intra-cluster data points and b(i) is the lowest average
dissimilarity to a neighboring cluster. For each data set, we try to find the k with the highest average SC.
3.3 Baseline Methods
Two baseline models—Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Auto Encoder (AE) are compared with the proposed
method. PCA and AE are general methods to learn low-dimensional embeddings. These embeddings can be thought of
as features learned from data. We compare these with our proposed method, AS2S. A key difference with AS2S is
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that each input vector is considered independent, while AS2S is a sequence model and captures temporal relationships
between subsequent examples.
3.3.1 Principal Component Analysis
PCA is a common statistical method to conduct dimension reduction for data. It uses orthogonal transformation to
convert data into a new space that has linearly uncorrelated variables in each dimension. The top p principal components
contain the most information of the data, where p is a parameter of the model. A detailed description of PCA can be
found in [19].
3.3.2 Auto Encoder
The basic structure of AE is a simple 3-layer neural network that includes input, hidden, and output layers. The raw data
is fed into the input layer, encoded into the hidden layer, and then decoded in the output layer. The optimization aims at
minimizing the difference between the input and the decoded output. To generate a dense representation for an input,
we take the outputs of the hidden layer. The number of hidden units, p, is a parameter of the model that controls the size
of the learned representations. The activation function used in our experiment is empirically chosen to be hyperbolic
tangent (tanh).
3.4 Attention Sequence-to-Sequence Recurrent Neural Network Model
In [12], Malhotra et al. adopt Sequence-to-Sequence Recurrent Neural Network model (S2S) for anomaly detection
in several time-series data, and show that S2S exhibits superior performance in detecting anomalies. The results
inspired us to apply such a model to security data with temporal dependencies. [14, 16, 17] introduce a powerful new
mechanism called “attention,” which provides the S2S model with the ability to find soft alignments between input and
output sequences. This mechanism has shown promising results in numerous natural language tasks, such as machine
translation, question answering, and artificial conversations (i.e., chat bots). However, this mechanism has not been
previously applied to time-series and security data. The intuition that the soft-alignment can help to capture more
accurate hidden state representations motivated us to experiment with AS2S.
Our model is most similar to [14]. Fig. 3 shows the AS2S network architecture. The encoder and decoder are both
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) with a Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) cell. The encoder network is defined as:
ht = fenc(xt, ht−1), (1)
where ht is the hidden state and xt is the input at timestamp t; fenc is the LSTM cell, which could be multi-layered.
At each timestamp the encoder RNN takes the previous hidden state hi−1 and the current window xi as the inputs
and outputs the current hidden state hi. The decoder network is defined in a similar way but includes an attention
component (network), which aims to capture the alignment between the input and output sequences.
si = fdec(xi+1, si+1, ci), (2)
where x′i is the i-th token in the output sequence, si is the i-th hidden state, and ci is the context vector. Note that
the sequence index is in the reversed order, e.g., from xk to x1, which is a convention to empirically achieve better
performance, i.e., the last token is easier to be decoded in early timestamps. Each context vector ci is computed by
weighting the input hidden states.
ci =
N∑
j=1
αijhj , (3)
where N is the sequence length, i is the i-th timestamp of the decoder, and αij is the weight for each hidden state hj
from the encoder. The weight αij is defined as
αij =
exp(aij)
Z
, (4)
aij = attn(si+1, hj), (5)
where Z is the normalization term; attn(.) is the attention network that takes the previous output state si+1 and hj
as inputs, and outputs the logit capturing the alignment. The attention component allows, at each timestamp, the
network to consider the weighted encoder states to make inferences. Similar to the previous two models, AS2S also
has a parameter p, which is the number of hidden units used in the encoder and decoder. To build the representations
of each input window, we design the loss function to be squared errors between the input and the output, i.e., it is a
sequence-to-sequence auto encoder with attention.
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Figure 3: AS2S architecture showing how X2’ (second sequence element) is predicted
4 Experimental Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method we use two real world data sets, and compare our performance with
the two selected baseline models. To evaluate the models, we randomly sample 15% of the users in each cluster as
the test set and 85% as the training set. We train all the models for 50 epochs. We use a development set from within
the training set for model selection. After features are learned, we use a simple anomaly detection algorithm based on
k-nearest neighbors to compute an anomaly score. Then we vary the anomaly threshold to compute precision and recall.
The performance of the models, based on Area Under Precision-Recall Curves (PR-AUC) computed from partial labels,
on the anomaly detection task is used as a proxy for feature learning.
4.1 Data Set
We refer to the two data sets as NETFLOW and CERT.
4.1.1 NETFLOW
The NETFLOW data set is from [20] and is converted into netflow format [21], a commonly-used data source in the IT
security industry. This data set spans 7 days and contains network-level information. Three types of features — simple
counts, bitmap, and top-K — are extracted. The features are directional. Half of the features are for incoming traffic
and half for outgoing. For example, in count features, there are 60 features in total, 30 for outgoing traffic and the other
30 for incoming traffic. The bitmap features aggregate the flag bits used in the window. For the top-k features, we
empirically pick k equal to 5. Note that since NETFLOW does not contain information like user profiles, we can only
use a subset of the training features as the cluster features. In this case, count and bitmap are selected as the clustering
features, since we recognize that they are more related to user behavior. In total, we identified 108 features for training.
4.1.2 CERT
The CERT data set [22] is quite large comparatively and has 516 days of data with application-level information and
user profiles. The features we use are similar to [11] but with some simplifications. The CERT data set contains many
application details and user profiles data as well. As a result, we can extract more features in this data set than in the
NETFLOW data set. For clustering, we use the categorical information from user profiles, e.g., user roles, current
projects, teams, and so on, as the features, and the discrete indices as their values. For training, 352 count features are
selected.
4.2 NETFLOW Results
Fig. 4 shows the quality of clustering as measured by the Silhouette Coefficient (SC) with respect to the number of
clusters, k of k-means. We can see that k = 2 gives us the best SC score. We can get an intuitive validation of this
clustering result by looking at Fig. 5, the t-SNE visualization of all the data points. t-SNE usually provides a good
visualization of high-dimension data; this visualization shows a clear margin between the two clusters and that one
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Figure 4: Determining the number of clusters K for NETFLOW
Figure 5: t-SNE visualization of NETFLOW
cluster is far larger than the other. If we consider the labels of the data points, we observe the smaller cluster (on left,
called cluster 1) has a higher proportion of anomalies (of 161 points, 35 are anomalous), which implies that clustering
successfully filters the anomalies to some extent. For cluster 0 (on right), it has an extremely small number of anomalies
(of 100 K points, 36 are anomalous), which makes the detection much harder. All methods perform poorly in detecting
anomalies in cluster 0.
Fig. 6 presents the anomaly detection results for cluster 1. Up to recall of 60%, AS2S provides higher precision, while
at higher recall all the three methods perform similarly. Overall AS2S outperforms the other two baselines based on
AUC, showing that temporal relationship and attention mechanism help anomaly detection in this scenario.
Figure 6: Anomaly detection results on the NETFLOW data set
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Figure 7: Determining the number of clusters K for the CERT data set
Figure 8: Anomaly detection results for cluster 5 of CERT.
4.3 CERT Results
Fig. 7 shows the quality of clusters as measured by the SC score with respect to the number of clusters, k. k = 7 is
selected as it gives us the best SC score. The number of data points in the clusters are distributed quite uniformly. Only
one cluster is relatively a bit larger.
In the CERT data set, there are only 47 anomalies out of nearly 1M data points. When we delve into the distribution of
these anomalies, we observe that only 3 clusters (cluster 0, 5, and 6) have anomalies, and only cluster 5 has enough
anomalies (32 anomalies) to provide statistically meaningful results. Therefore, in Fig. 8, we only show the results for
cluster 5. AS2S has the highest area under the precision-recall curve, followed by AE and then PCA. The results show
that, similar to the NETFLOW results, AS2S is able to detect anomalies better than the baselines.
4.4 Discussion
Feature learning in images and natural languages is obvious for humans. Learned image features like texture, edges,
objects require no explanations. However, the same is not true for security data. Here we use performance on an
anomaly detection task as a proxy for quality of feature learning, quantified by PR-AUC. As the AS2S model was
trained, we wanted to explore if the features learned improved. Note that PR-AUC already captures this quantitatively
for all the final models.
Fig. 9 shows the scatter plots of the hidden layer outputs for AS2S projected onto two dimensions. It is from cluster 1
in the NETFLOW test data set during training. Out of 21 points, 5 are anomalous in this test set, so we can clearly see
the changes during training. In the early epoch (top), all the data points distribute randomly. In epoch 15 (middle) some
points aggregate to the left and some to the right. In epoch 24 (bottom), we can see that 3 anomalies aggregate to the
right, which is good. However, some other anomalies are on the left together with the normal points. This means that,
on one hand, some anomalies have clear properties and can be identified by AS2S; on the other hand, some are similar
to the normal nodes, and therefore are unlikely to be detected. These plots demonstrate the effectiveness of AS2S to
progressively learn more meaningful representations of NETFLOW for detecting anomalies without any labels.
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Figure 9: Scatter plots of features learned with AS2S model from the test set of cluster 1 in NETFLOW. From top to
bottom, the plot is from epoch 1, 15, and 24 respectively. The anomalies are in red and the normal data points are in
blue.
We use a precision-recall curve instead of a ROC curve, since the data is highly skewed (as expected because anomalies
are rare), and ROC curves are misleading is such cases. Furthermore, precision, which is the fraction of true positives
(out of all positives marked by a model), directly quantifies the overhead on a security operations center analyst. While
ideally one would prefer both high precision and high recall, for a particular classifier higher precision is usually
preferred to prevent alarm fatigue (and since in practice a large number of classifier are simultaneously deployed, the
recall across the entire system may still be good).
5 Conclusions
We explored multiple methods for unsupervised and self-supervised feature learning for security data. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply the attention mechanism (AS2S) in security anomaly detection. We
demonstrated that AS2S generally performs well for anomaly detection, especially for NETFLOW data, outperforming
PCA and AE. However, anomaly detection for clusters with extremely small number of anomalies is difficult for all
of the models we experimented with. These factors reveal the difficulties of unsupervised and self-supervised feature
learning from security data and further research is required to address them.
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